misfortunes, fell upon
him in an ungenerous manner, and made a partition treaty of his
provinces. The Czar, still more to accommodate himself to the genius of
his great enemy, unlike his confederates, who, upon all occasions,
spared no reflections and even very unbecoming ones (bullying memorials
and hectoring manifestoes), spoke all along with the utmost civility of
his brother Charles as he calls him, maintains him to be the greatest
general in Europe, and even publicly avers, he will more trust a word
from him than the greatest assurances, oaths, nay, even treaties with
his confederates. These kind of civilities may, perhaps, make a deeper
impression upon the noble mind of the King of Sweden, and he be
persuaded rather to sacrifice a real interest to a generous enemy, than
to gratify, in things of less moment, those by whom he has been ill, and
even inhumanly used. But if this should not succeed, the Czar is still a
gainer by having made his confederates uneasy at these his separate
negotiations; and as we find by the newspapers, the more solicitous to
keep him ready to their confederacy, which must cost them very large
proffers and promises. In the meantime he leaves the Dane and the Swede
securely bound up together in war, and weakening one another as fast as
they can, and he turns towards the Empire and views the Protestant
Princes there; and, under many specious pretences, not only marches and
counter-marches about their several territories his troops that came
back from Denmark, but makes also slowly advance towards Germany those
whom he has kept this great while in Poland, under pretence to help the
King against his dissatisfied subjects, whose commotions all the while
he was the greatest fomenter of. He considers the Emperor is in war with
the Turks, and therefore has found, by too successful experience, how
little his Imperial Majesty is able to show his authority in protecting
the members of the Empire. His troops remain in Mecklenburg,
notwithstanding their departure is highly insisted upon. His replies to
all the demands on that subject are filled with such reasons as if he
would give new laws to the Empire.

Now let us suppose that the King of Sweden should think it more
honourable to make a peace with the Czar, and to carry the force of his
resentment against his less generous enemies, what a stand will then the
princes of the empire, even those that unadvisedly drew in 40,000
Muscovites, to secure the