s by
domestic animals, known to be vicious, as disappearing rudiments of
the old liability to make composition. The common American doctrine as
to cattle running at large upon uncultivated lands seemed to confirm
this. Yet one need but look beneath the surface to see that the
English rule was rejected for a time in America, not because it was
in conflict with a fundamental principle of no liability without
fault, but because it presupposed a settled community, where it was
contrary to the general security to turn cattle out to graze, whereas
in pioneer American communities of the past vacant lands which were
owned and those which were not owned could not be distinguished and
the grazing resources of the community were often its most important
resources. The common-law rule, without regard to its basis, was for a
time inapplicable to local conditions. It is significant that as the
conditions that made the rule inapplicable have come to an end the
rule has generally re-established itself. In England it is in full
vigor so that the owner of trespassing animals is held for disease
communicated by them although he had no knowledge or reason to suppose
they were diseased. A rule that can re-establish itself and extend its
scope in this way is not moribund. It must have behind it some basis
in the securing of social interests. Nor have the attempts of some
American courts to narrow common-law liability for injuries by known
vicious animals to cases of negligent keeping made much headway. The
weight of American authority remains with the common-law rule and in
England the Court of Appeal has carried the rule out to the extent of
holding the owner notwithstanding the animal was turned loose by the
wrongful act of an intermeddling third person. Nor have the
predictions that the doctrine of _Rylands_ v. _Fletcher_ would
disappear from the law through the courts' smothering it with
exceptions--predictions commonly made at the end of the last
century--been verified in the event. In 1914 the English courts
refused to limit the doctrine to adjacent free-holders and they have
since extended it to new situations. Moreover in America, where we had
been told it was decisively rejected, it has been applied in the past
decade by more than one court. The leading American cases that profess
to reject the doctrine did not involve it nor did they involve the
postulate of civilized society on which, as I think, it is based. Also
the Court of App
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