ourt followed authority.
In New Hampshire Chief Justice Doe was not willing to go on mere
authority and decided on the general principle that liability must
flow from fault.

Another view is that the doctrine of _Rylands_ v. _Fletcher_ is a
crude attempt, when negligence and the doctrine of _res ipsa loquitur_
were none too well understood, to apply the principle of the latter
doctrine, and that those doctrines will suffice to reach the actual
result. No doubt _res ipsa loquitur_ gives a possible mode of treating
cases where one maintains something likely to get out of hand and do
injury. For four possible solutions may be found for such cases. One
is absolute liability, as in _Rylands_ v. _Fletcher_. Another is to
put the burden of proof of due care on the defendant, as French law
does in some cases and as is done by some American decisions and some
statutes in case of fires set by locomotives. A third is to apply the
doctrine of _res ipsa loquitur_. A fourth would be to require the
plaintiff to prove negligence, as is done by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey where a known vicious animal breaks loose. That the fourth,
which is the solution required by the theory of no liability without
fault, has found but two courts to uphold it, and that only in the
case of vicious domestic animals, is suggestive. _Res ipsa loquitur_
may easily run into a dogmatic fiction, and must do so, if made to
achieve the result of the doctrine of _Rylands_ v. _Fletcher_, which
does not permit the defendant to go forward with proof, short of _vis
maior_ or the unanticipated unlawful act of a third person beyond
defendant's control. The vitality and persistence of the doctrine
against theoretical assault for more than a generation show that it is
more than a historical anomaly or a dogmatic blunder.

Another type of common-law liability without fault, the so-called
liability of the carrier as an insurer and the liability of the
innkeeper, is relational and depends upon a different postulate.
Nineteenth-century courts in the United States endeavored to hold down
the former, restricting it because of its inconsistency with the
doctrine of liability as a corollary of fault. But it has proved to
have abundant vitality, has been extended by legislation in some
states to carriers of passengers and has been upheld by recent
legislation everywhere.

Two other types of liability, contractual and relational, must receive
brief notice. The former has lo