d since, under the penalty of extinction, men must
assume the headship of a family, hereditary slavery may be foreseen in
it.

Let us put this view of the case on one side for a moment. We assume
that we are convinced by Herr Duehring's maxim and that we are zealous
for the full equalisation of the two wills, for the "universal
sovereignty of man" for the "sovereignty of the individual,"
magnificent expressions, in comparison with which Stirner's
"individual" with his private property is a mere bungler though he
might claim his modest part therein. Then we are all free and
independent. All? No, not even now. There are still "occasional
dependent relations" but these are to be explained "on grounds which
must be sought not in the action of two wills as such but in a third
consideration, in the case of children, for example, in the
inadequateness of their self-assertion."

Indeed, the foundations of independence are not to be sought in the
realisation of the two wills as such. Naturally not, since the
realisation of one of the wills is thus interfered with. But they must
be sought in a third direction. And what is the third direction? The
actual fixing of a subjected will as an inadequate one. So far has our
realistic philosopher departed from reality that will, the real
content, the characteristic determination of this will serves him as a
third ground, for abstract and indefinite speech. However this may be
we must agree that equality has its exceptions. It does not apply to a
will which is infected with inadequateness of self expression.

Further, "Where the animal and the human are intermingled in one
person can one in the name of a second fully developed human being
demand the same actions as in the case of a single human being ... our
supposition is here of two morally unequal persons of which one has a
share of purely animal characteristics in a certain sense the typical
fundamental conception which characterises the differences in and
between groups of men." Now the reader may see by these modest excuses
in which Herr Duehring turns and winds like a Jesuit priest to
establish a casuistical position, how far the human human can prevail
over the bestial human, how far he can employ deceit, warlike, keen
terrorising means of deceit against the latter without overstepping
immutable ethical bounds.

Therefore, if two persons are "morally unequal" there is an end of
equality. It was therefore not worth while to con