ty of everything, where the dialectic mystery for
the faithful, where the dialectic hocus pocus, and the Hegelian
intricacies, without which, Marx, according to Herr Duehring, cannot
develop his own ideas? Marx simply pointed to history and showed
briefly that just as the small industry necessarily produced the
conditions of its own downfall, by its own development, that is to say
by the expropriation of the small holders of private property so now
the capitalistic method of production has itself developed likewise
the material circumstances which must cause its downfall. The process
is a historical one and, if it is at the same time dialectic, it is
not to the discredit of Marx, that it happens to be so fatal to Herr
Duehring.

In the first place, since Marx is ready with his historical economic
proof, he proceeds "The capitalistic method of production and method
of appropriation, that is to say capitalistic private property is the
first negation of individual private property founded on labor of
individuals, the negation of capitalistic production will be
self-produced with the necessity of a natural process, etc." (as
quoted above).

Although Marx therefore shows the occurrence of this event as negation
of the negation, he has no intention of proving by this means that it
is a historical necessity. On the contrary "After he has shown that
the actual fact has partially declared itself, and has, as yet
partially to declare itself, he shows it also as a fact which fulfils
itself in accordance with a certain dialectic law." That is all. It is
therefore again merely supposition on Herr Duehring's part to assert
that the negation of the negation must act as a midwife by whose
means the future is brought out of the womb of the present, or that
Marx wants to convince anyone of the necessity of social ownership of
land and capital upon the credit of the negation of the negation.

It shows a complete lack of comprehension of the nature of the
dialectic to regard it as Herr Duehring does, as an instrument of mere
proof, just as one can after a limited fashion employ formal logic or
elementary mathematics. Formal logic is itself more than anything else
a method for the discovery of new results, for advancing from the
known to the unknown, and so, but in a much more distinguished sense,
is the dialectic, which, since it transcends the narrow limits of
formal logic, attains a more comprehensive philosophical position. It
is th