rsed fleet of the Patrona Bey to seek refuge in
the port of Navarin.
In the mean time the position of Captain Hastings was one of extreme
danger, and Lord Cochrane, who addressed his last official
communication to him on the 12th of October, conveys his parting words
of praise and confidence in the following terms:--"You have done so
much good, and so much is anticipated from your keeping open the
communications between the shores of the gulf, that I think you would
do well to remain for a while where you are. You occupy, however, a
position of risk, if the reports are true regarding the fleet being
off Patras; and therefore I leave you to act in all things as you
judge best for the public service." Hastings, as soon as he was
informed of Ibrahim Pasha's intention to attack him, and before he had
received the news of his deliverance by the movement of Sir Edward
Codrington's squadron, had selected the spot in which he hoped to be
able to defy the attacks of the whole fleet sent against him. He chose
a small bay at the eastern extremity of the Gulf of Corinth, formed in
the rocky precipices of Mount Geranion, and open to the Alcyonian sea.
This little bay or port is called Strava. Its entrance is protected by
two rocky islands, and it is bounded on the continent by a succession
of precipices covered by pine woods, which render the debarkation of a
large force in the neighbourhood very difficult. Hastings proposed to
defend this position by landing four of his guns on the mainland and
the islands; and he made every preparation for receiving the Egyptians
with a well-sustained fire of hot shot, while a number of Greek troops
were assembled to man the rocks around.
There can be no doubt that Ibrahim Pasha committed a blunder in
violating the convention into which he had just entered, and his
attempt at taking vengeance into his own hands, instead of appealing
to the three allied powers, created great distrust on the part of the
admirals. They naturally enough conceived that he would always hold
himself ready to take every advantage of their absence, and their only
method of effectually watching the immense fleet assembled at Navarin
was by bringing their own squadrons to an anchor in that immense
harbour. The battle of Navarin, on the 20th of October, was the
natural consequence of the distrust on the one side, and the eager
desire of revenge on the other, which rendered the proximity of the
different fleets necessary.
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