ted until August 12th to
take any other measures for relieving the garrisons. Yet all the time
the gallant General felt that he had not a free hand, and could not
take independent action, for he writes in his journal:--

"Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a military
point of view, a very great bore, for we never could act as if
independent; there was always the chance of their taking action,
which hampered us.... It is truly deplorable, the waste of men and
money on account of our indecision."

The mistake our Government made was the old one of endeavouring to
control details in distant countries from Downing Street, instead of
sending out the best man to the spot, and giving him more or less of a
free hand.

At last, on April 16th, Gordon telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring at
Cairo:--

"As far as I can understand, the situation is this: You state your
intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you
refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to
circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can
suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire
to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning
the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, and Dongola, with the certainty
that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under
great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt!"

But though Gordon saw that it was impossible to attempt an immediate
evacuation with something like 50,000 men, women, and children, he did
everything that lay within his power to get rid of as many refugees as
possible during the few weeks that he was in Khartoum before the means
of communication were cut off. The measures he took were described by
Colonel Duncan, M.P., at that time in command of a station on the Nile,
through which the refugees had to pass _en route_ to Egypt, in a
speech made some time afterwards, as follows:--

"Last year, after the arrival of General Gordon at Khartoum, I was
sent to the northern end of the Korosko desert to facilitate the
passage of the refugees from Khartoum to Egypt. It was then that I
realised the true nature of Gordon, who was not a mere sentimental
philanthropist, but a man of business as well as a man of courage.
At that time the telegraph wire between Khartoum and where I was
stationed was still uncut; and with mar