had been sunk. The
six journals were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson, who, by right of
seniority, had taken command on the death of Sir Herbert Stewart. A
note was also given to Sir Charles, which had been brought by a
messenger from Khartoum, to the following effect: "Khartoum all right,
could hold out for years.--C. G. Gordon, 29th December 1884."

It was at first generally believed that this document was but one of
many sent out in order to deceive the enemy, but it is now thought that
his real object was not to deceive the enemy, who knew only too well
the actual state of affairs, so much as to get them to let his
messengers pass, if caught by them, and that then the messengers could
deliver a _viva voce_ message, and tell the appalling truth.

Sir Charles Wilson, with two officers and a small detachment of
Englishmen belonging to the Sussex regiment (late 35th), started on the
morning of the 24th for Khartoum in two of Gordon's steamers. The delay
that occurred between the arrival of the English force at Gubat, and
the start up the river for Khartoum, has been freely criticised by the
press. The journey from Gubat to Khartoum being entirely by water, Lord
Charles Beresford, a well-known naval officer, had been attached to
Stewart's force, with orders "at once to take over and man any steamer
or steamers that were either there or in the vicinity," and to "use
every means in his power to get one or more of the steamers into an
efficient state." Unfortunately, the British force that reached the
Nile was in a very different condition from that which left Korti in
such high spirits. Rapid marching and hard fighting had demanded a
heavy penalty, and the death-roll and sick-list were very high; among
others, Lord Charles Beresford himself was on the latter.

The whole force under Sir Charles Wilson did not equal a battalion of
infantry on its war strength, and it included a large percentage of
sick and wounded to be looked after. In addition to this, reports came
into camp that large bodies of Arabs were advancing from the north as
well as from the south, with the object of annihilating the force. The
commander, therefore, had an anxious time of it, and was compelled to
undertake a reconnaissance to ascertain the truth of the rumours, and
to make all sorts of preparations for defending his little camp with
its sick and wounded against any sudden onslaught. He was unconscious
of the fact that time was so pressing, and