advisable to take for the
security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that
country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum,
&c., &c." Added, however, to these instructions was an insignificant
clause to which no one at the time attached much importance, and which
ran as follows, "You will consider yourself authorised and instructed
to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring."
The Egyptian Government decided to make Gordon Governor-General of the
Soudan, and the Khedive gave into his hands all the absolute power that
he himself possessed; this appointment was sanctioned by the British
Government, and officially communicated to Gordon by Sir E. Baring. In
view of this appointment, most readers will concur in the opinion of
Mr. Egmont Hake, the editor of Gordon's Journals, that "it is as unfair
as it is illogical to talk about General Gordon having exceeded the
instructions conveyed to him by Her Majesty's Government." The real
truth is that it was impossible for Gordon to exceed his instructions.
He himself again and again contended that while it was open to the
Khedive to cancel the appointment, until that was done he was
absolutely master of the situation, to do as he thought best for the
good of the country.

It must not, however, be supposed that General Gordon availed himself
of a flaw in his instructions to carry out a policy of his own. On the
contrary, he clearly understood from the British Government that
evacuation was what was required, and that all the Egyptian employes
must be given a chance of leaving the Soudan if possible. From
beginning to end this was the one thing he held out as the object at
which he aimed. All the suggestions he put forward were made with this
end in view, and he never swerved from it. He was in reality more true
to the instructions he received than were those who issued them. No
sooner had he got into the country, and grasped the actual state of
affairs, than he saw that things were looking very serious. The
interval between Hicks's defeat and his own arrival had been too
prolonged. People who might have been loyal had lost heart and gone
over to the Mahdi. Added to this, Gordon had himself made public the
fact that the country was to be evacuated, so all who intended to
remain behind saw that their best policy was to throw in their lot with
the Mahdi. G