telligence that enabled him to discern the
rising genius of a recruit to anti-Masonry whose name was to help make
illustrious any cause which he served.
CHAPTER XXXIV
VAN BUREN'S ENEMIES MAKE HIM VICE PRESIDENT
1829-1832
Martin Van Buren's single message as governor exhibited a knowledge of
conditions and needs that must rank it among the ablest state-papers
in the archives of the capitol. Unlike some of his predecessors, with
their sentences of stilted formality, he wrote easily and with vigour.
His message, however, was marred by the insincerity which shows the
politician. He approved canals, but, by cunningly advising "the utmost
prudence" in taking up new enterprises, he coolly disparaged the
Chenango project; he shrewdly recommended the choice of presidential
electors by general ticket instead of by congressional districts,
knowing that opposition to the change died with DeWitt Clinton. With
full knowledge of what he himself had done, in the last campaign, in
urging upon John A. Hamilton the necessity of raising funds, he boldly
attacked the use of money in elections, proposing "the imposition of
severe penalties upon the advance of money by individuals for any
purposes connected with elections except the single one of printing."
It is not surprising, perhaps, that a man of Van Buren's personal
ambition found himself often compelled, for the sake of his own
career, to make his public devotion to principle radically different
from his practice; but it is amazing that he should thus brazenly
assume the character of a reformer before the ink used in writing
Hamilton was dry.
The prominent feature of Van Buren's message was the bank question,
which, to do him credit, he discussed with courage, urging a general
law for chartering banks without the payment of money bonus, and
declaring that the only concern of the State should be to make banks
and their circulation secure. In accord with this suggestion, he
submitted the "safety fund" project, subsequently enacted into law,
providing that all banks should contribute to a fund, administered
under state supervision, to secure dishonoured banknotes. There was a
great deal of force in Van Buren's reasoning, and the New York City
banks, which, at first, declined to recharter under the law, finally
accepted the scheme with apparent cheerfulness. Had the real test,
which came with the hard times of 1837, not broken it down, Van
Buren's confidence in the proj
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