the metaphysical question of
freewill and determinism. For the character of the individual's brain
depends in any case on ante-natal accidents and coincidences, and so
it may be said that the role of individuals ultimately depends on
chance,--the accidental coincidence of independent sequences.]
[Footnote 243: I have taken this example from G. Tarde's _La logique
sociale_ (p. 403), Paris, 1904, where it is used for quite a different
purpose.]
[Footnote 244: _Die kulturhistorische Methode_, Berlin, 1900, p. 26.]
[Footnote 245: _Ibid._ pp. 28, 29.]
X
DARWINISM AND SOCIOLOGY
BY C. BOUGLE
_Professor of Social Philosophy in the University of Toulouse and
Deputy-Professor at the Sorbonne, Paris_
How has our conception of social phenomena, and of their history, been
affected by Darwin's conception of Nature and the laws of its
transformation? To what extent and in what particular respects have
the discoveries and hypotheses of the author of _The Origin of
Species_ aided the efforts of those who have sought to construct a
science of society?
To such a question it is certainly not easy to give any brief or
precise answer. We find traces of Darwinism almost everywhere.
Sociological systems differing widely from each other have laid claim
to its authority; while, on the other hand, its influence has often
made itself felt only in combination with other influences. The
Darwinian thread is worked into a hundred patterns along with other
threads.
To deal with the problem, we must, it seems, first of all distinguish
the more general conclusions in regard to the evolution of living
beings, which are the outcome of Darwinism, from the particular
explanations it offers of the ways and means by which that evolution
is effected. That is to say, we must, as far as possible, estimate
separately the influence of Darwin as an evolutionist and Darwin as a
selectionist.
The nineteenth century, said Cournot, has witnessed a mighty effort to
"reintegrer l'homme dans la nature." From divers quarters there has
been a methodical reaction against the persistent dualism of the
Cartesian tradition, which was itself the unconscious heir of the
Christian tradition. Even the philosophy of the eighteenth century,
materialistic as were for the most part the tendencies of its leaders,
seemed to revere man as a being apart, concerning whom laws might be
formulated _a priori_. To bring him down from his pedestal there was
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