omic world. Attempts to curb it were in the highest degree
imprudent. The spirit of Liberalism here seemed in conformity with the
trend of nature: in this respect, at least, contemporary naturalism,
offspring of the discoveries of the nineteenth century, brought
reinforcements to the individualist doctrine, begotten of the
speculations of the eighteenth: but only, it appeared, to turn mankind
away for ever from humanitarian dreams. Would those whom such
conclusions repelled be content to oppose to nature's imperatives
only the protests of the heart? There were some who declared, like
Brunetiere, that the laws in question, valid though they might be for
the animal kingdom, were not applicable to the human. And so a return
was made to the classic dualism. This indeed seems to be the line that
Huxley took, when, for instance, he opposed to the cosmic process an
ethical process which was its reverse.

But the number of thinkers whom this antithesis does not satisfy grows
daily. Although the pessimism which claims authorisation from Darwin's
doctrines is repugnant to them, they still are unable to accept the
dualism which leaves a gulf between man and nature. And their
endeavour is to link the two by showing that while Darwin's laws
obtain in both kingdoms, the conditions of their application are not
the same: their forms, and, consequently, their results, vary with the
varying mediums in which the struggle of living beings takes place,
with the means these beings have at disposal, with the ends even which
they propose to themselves.

Here we have the explanation of the fact that among determined
opponents of war partisans of the "struggle for existence" can be
found: there are disciples of Darwin in the peace party. Novicow, for
example, admits the "_combat universel_" of which Le Dantec[255]
speaks; but he remarks that at different stages of evolution, at
different stages of life the same weapons are not necessarily
employed. Struggles of brute force, armed hand to hand conflicts, may
have been a necessity in the early phases of human societies.
Nowadays, although competition may remain inevitable and
indispensable, it can assume milder forms. Economic rivalries,
struggles between intellectual influences, suffice to stimulate
progress: the processes which these admit are, in the actual state of
civilisation, the only ones which attain their end without waste, the
only ones logical. From one end to the other of the ladder