tho paid at the charge of that kingdom; which permission is
extended by statute (8 Geo. III, c. 13) to 16,235 men, in time of
peace.

To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress, says Baron
Montesquieu,[49] it is requisite that the armies with which it is
entrusted should consist of the people, and have the same spirit with
the people; as was the case at Rome, till Marius new modeled the
legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy, and laid the foundation of
all the military tyranny that ensued. Nothing, then, according to
these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state,
than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be
kept on foot, a body too distinct from the people. Like ours, it
should be wholly composed of natural subjects; it ought only to be
enlisted for a short and limited time; the soldiers also should live
intermixt with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland
fortresses should be allowed. And perhaps it might be still better if,
by dismissing a stated number, and enlisting others at every renewal
of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the
people, and the citizen and the soldier be mere intimately connected
together.

To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of Parliament
likewise passes, "to punish mutiny and desertion, and for the better
payment of the army and their quarters." This regulates the manner in
which they are to be dispersed among the several innkeepers and
victualers throughout the kingdom, and establishes a law martial for
their government. By this, among other things, it is enacted that if
any officer or soldier shall excite, or join any mutiny, or, knowing
of it, shall not give notice to the commanding officer; or shall
desert, or list in any other regiment, or sleep upon his post, or
leave it before he is relieved, or hold correspondence with a rebel or
enemy, or strike or use violence to his superior officer, or shall
disobey his lawful commands; such offender shall suffer such
punishment a court martial shall inflict, tho it extend to death
itself.

However expedient the most strict regulations may be in time of actual
war, yet in times of profound peace a little relaxation of military
rigor would not, one should hope, be productive of much inconvenience.
And upon this principle, tho by our standing laws (still remaining in
force, tho not attended to), desertion in time of war is made f