to the
Czarina that she should accede to the peace which they were negociating
with Austria, and that all conquests should be restored. This she
flatly refused; but subsequently, being deprived of lier ally, and
seeing that it was at present impossible for her to subjugate Turkey to
her sway, she offered to restore all her acquisitions, except the city
and dependencies of Oczakow, an important place, commanding the mouth
of the Dnieper, at a distance of less than two hundred miles off the
Turkish capital. As this offer exhibited an inclination on the part of
the Czarina to re-commence the war at some future period, the allies
projected a more effectual interference, and on the 28th of March Pitt
delivered a message from the king on the subject. His majesty acquainted
his faithful commons, that his endeavours, in conjunction with his
allies, to accomplish a pacification with Russia and the Porte had
proved abortive; and that the consequences which might arise from the
continuance of the war being important to his own interests, as well as
those of his allies and to Europe in general, he judged it requisite, in
order to add weight to his representations, to augment his naval forces,
relying on the zeal and affection of the house of commons to make good
such expenses as might be incurred. After delivering this message, Pitt
moved an address to the king, thanking him for it, and promising him
the support of the house. In doing so the minister represented, that, if
Russia should be allowed to gather any material strength at the expense
of Turkey, the effect would be injurious to the interests of all
Europe; and that the interference of England was indispensable for the
preservation of that balance of power, which all statesmen and men
of all parties held to be essential for the security of Europe. This
doctrine was very ancient, and had long been the doctrine of both Whig
and Tory, but it was now despised by the opposition, who, to a man,
became the champions of the Czarina. It was argued that it would be
folly to sacrifice all the advantages of our immense trade with Russia
for the sake of a Turkish fortress; that neither wisdom nor policy could
justify Great Britain in going to war to preserve a barbarian power,
which for the sake of religion, justice, and humanity ought to be
utterly extirpated; and that, as we had received no injury from Russia,
all hostile interference on our part was wholly unnecessary. On the
other han
|