oach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour;
others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up
for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas
solitary truth cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the
same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that
acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to bee
rejected. How did the incredulous World gaze at _Columbus_ when hee
promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a
long time by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian
Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an
experiment. Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could
finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of
the World; 'tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver,
shall receive any thing from the men of these daies, especially our
vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the
unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that
are ignorant of the causes of things, and reiected by others whose
perversenesse ties them to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride
will not allow any new thing for truth which they themselves were not
the first inventors of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a
pragmaticall ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this
opinion _Xenophanes_, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit
to his assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For
_Natales Comes_ speaking of that Philosopher,[1] and this his opinion,
saith thus,
_Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in
Philosophia introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant._
"Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will
bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they
may bee famed for the invention of somewhat."
The same author doth also in another place accuse _Anaxagoras_[2] of
folly for the same opinion,
_Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiae, vel si nescias quid dicas,
tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire._
"'Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or
other, when a man knows not what to say."
[Sidenote 1: _Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17._]
[Sidenote 2: _Lib. 7. c. 1._]
If these
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