easily be removed without a great deale of preparation, and I
could not tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for
an impartiall survey of the following discourse.

I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it
was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such an
uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being
counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read _Plutarch_,
_Galilaeus_, _Keplar_, with some others, and finding many of mine owne
thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it
was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was
another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this
assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as
may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the
suppositions imply'd in this opinion may seeme to contradict the
principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove
this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving
those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to
performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then
proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly belong
to the maine point in hand.

Proposition 2.

_That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of
reason or faith._

Tis reported of _Aristotle_ that when hee saw the bookes of _Moses_ he
commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but
withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a
Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were
delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And
'tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he confirmes it
by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an
argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked
out of his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a
necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such
necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for
it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he
himselfe urges in this subject,[1] are very weake and farre enough from
having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a
plurality of worlds doth not contrad