son
of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary
for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra; in fact
his successor Libo--for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted
fatigues--even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium,
till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island
in front of it on which he had established himself. It was
not possible for Caesar's officers to convey the second portion
of the army over to their general. As little did he himself
succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pompeius learned through
one of Caesar's peace envoys as to his preparations for the voyage
to the Epirot coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march,
threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal.
The situation of Caesar was critical. Although he extended his range
in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible,
the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precarious,
while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium
and masters of the sea, had abundance of everything. With his army
presumably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle
to that of Pompeius at least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself
fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead
of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters
between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus,
facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the arrival
of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate
the enemy with an irresistibly superior force. Thus months passed.
If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy
a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar
still in the same position, he was to all appearance lost,
with his weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between
the immense fleet and the three times superior land army of the enemy;
and already the winter was drawing to a close. His sole hope
still depended on the transport fleet; that it should steal
or fight its way through the blockade was hardly to be hoped for;
but after the first voluntary foolhardiness this second venture
was enjoined by necessity. How desperate his situation appeared
to Caesar himself, is shown by his resolution--when the fleet
still came not--to sail alone in a fisherman's boat across the Adriatic
to Brundisium in order to fetch it; which, in reality, was only abandone