ead,
did the duty, as he understood it, of its leader amidst daily peril
to his life and perhaps without hope of success; his fidelity to duty
deserves respect, but to be the last at a forlorn post is commendable
in the soldier, not in the general. He had not the skill
either to organize or to bring into action at the proper time
the powerful reserve, which had sprung up as it were spontaneously
in Italy for the party of the overthrown government; and he had
for good reasons never made any pretension to the military leadership,
on which everything ultimately depended. If instead of this man,
who knew not how to act either as party-chief or as general,
a man of the political and military mark of Pompeius should raise
the banner of the existing constitution, the municipals of Italy
would necessarily flock towards it in crowds, that under it
they might help to fight, if not indeed for the kingship of Pompeius,
at any rate against the kingship of Caesar.

To this was added another consideration at least as important.
It was characteristic of Pompeius, even when he had formed a resolve,
not to be able to find his way to its execution. While he knew
perhaps how to conduct war but certainly not how to declare it,
the Catonian party, although assuredly unable to conduct it,
was very able and above all very ready to supply grounds for the war
against the monarchy on the point of being founded. According to
the intention of Pompeius, while he kept himself aloof, and in his
peculiar way, now talked as though he would immediately depart
for his Spanish provinces, now made preparations as though he would
set out to take over the command on the Euphrates, the legitimate
governing board, namely the senate, were to break with Caesar,
to declare war against him, and to entrust the conduct of it to Pompeius,
who then, yielding to the general desire, was to come forward
as the protector of the constitution against demagogico-
monarchical plots, as an upright man and champion of the existing
order of things against the profligates and anarchists,
as the duly-installed general of the senate against the Imperator
of the street, and so once more to save his country. Thus Pompeius
gained by the alliance with the conservatives both a second army
in addition to his personal adherents, and a suitable war-manifesto--
advantages which certainly were purchased at the high price
of coalescing with those who were in principle opposed to him.
O