and more advantageously, than if he now as proconsul
of Gaul gave orders to march against the senate and its general.
Certainly the success of this plan depended on Pompeius being good-
natured enough to let Caesar still obtain the consulship for 706
assured to him at Luca; but, even if it failed, it would be always
of advantage for Caesar to have given practical and repeated
evidence of the most yielding disposition. On the one hand time
would thus be gained for attaining his object meanwhile in Gaul;
on the other hand his opponents would be left with the odium
of initiating the rupture and consequently the civil war--
which was of the utmost moment for Caesar with reference to the majority
of the senate and the party of material interests, and more especially
with reference to his own soldiers.

On these views he acted. He armed certainly; the number of his legion
was raised through new levies in the winter of 702-703 to eleven,
including that borrowed from Pompeius. But at the same time
he expressly and openly approved of Pompeius' conduct during
the dictatorship and the restoration of order in the capital
which he had effected, rejected the warnings of officious friends
as calumnies, reckoned every day by which he succeeded
in postponing the catastrophe a gain, overlooked whatever
could be overlooked and bore whatever could be borne--
immoveably adhering only to the one decisive demand that,
when his governorship of Gaul came to an end with 705,
the second consulship, admissible by republican state-law
and promised to him according to agreement by his colleague,
should be granted to him for the year 706.

Preparation for Attacks on Caesar

This very demand became the battle-field of the diplomatic war
which now began. If Caesar were compelled either to resign
his office of governor before the last day of December 705,
or to postpone the assumption of the magistracy in the capital
beyond the 1st January 706, so that he should remain for a time
between the governorship and the consulate without office,
and consequently liable to criminal impeachment--which according
to Roman law was only allowable against one who was not in office--
the public had good reason to prophesy for him in this case
the fate of Milo, because Cato had for long been ready to impeach him
and Pompeius was a more than doubtful protector.

Attempt to Keep Caesar Out of the Consulship

Now, to attain that object, Caesar's opponents had a