and without going into many details, I will only mention
the fact that it is more difficult than it sounds for armies--even for
the sturdy Russian soldier--to march hundreds of miles across deserts
without water for men and animals, or over a high plateau like Tibet,
where (although suggested by the wise newspaper Englishman at home as a
sanatorium for British troops in India) the terrific climate, great
altitudes, lack of fuel, and a few other such trifles would reduce even
the largest European army into a very humble one at the end of a journey
across it.
Then people seem to be ignorant of the fact that, with a mountainous
natural frontier like the Himahlyas, a Maxim gun or two above each of the
few passable passes would bring to reason any army--allowing that it
could get thus far--that intended to cross over into India!
But, besides, have we not got soldiers to defend India? Why should we
fear the Russians? Are we not as good as they are? Why should we ever
encourage the so far unconcerned Russian to come to India by showing our
fear? It is neither manly nor has it any sense in it. The Russian has no
designs whatever upon India at present--he does not even dream of
advancing on India--but should India eventually fall into Russia's
hands--which is not probable--believe me, it will never be by a Russian
army marching into India from the north, or north-west, or west. The
danger, if there is any, may be found probably very much nearer home, in
our own ignorance and blindness.
We also hear much about the infamy of Russia in placing a tariff on all
goods in transit for Persia, and we are told that this is another blow
directed at English trade. Such is not the case. Russia, I am told by
people who ought to know, would be only too glad to come to an
understanding with England on some sensible basis, but she certainly is
not quite so unwise as we are in letting Germany, her real enemy, swamp
her market with cheap goods. The tariff is chiefly a protection against
Germany. Of course, if we choose to help Germany to ruin Russia's markets
as well as our own, then we must suffer in consequence, but looking ahead
towards the future of Asia, it might possibly not be unwise to come to
some sensible arrangement with Russia, by which her commercial interests
and ours would mutually benefit instead of suffering as they do at
present.
In Persia we are playing a rapidly losing game. Commercially, as I have
already said, we have
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