her of events or of
objects. All the same they are there for recognition although
undiscriminated in our sense-awareness. The demarcation of events, the
splitting of nature up into parts is effected by the objects which we
recognise as their ingredients. The discrimination of nature is the
recognition of objects amid passing events. It is a compound of the
awareness of the passage of nature, of the consequent partition of
nature, and of the definition of certain parts of nature by the modes of
the ingression of objects into them.

You may have noticed that I am using the term 'ingression' to denote the
general relation of objects to events. The ingression of an object into
an event is the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue
of the being of the object. Namely the event is what it is, because the
object is what it is; and when I am thinking of this modification of the
event by the object, I call the relation between the two 'the ingression
of the object into the event.' It is equally true to say that objects
are what they are because events are what they are. Nature is such that
there can be no events and no objects without the ingression of objects
into events. Although there are events such that the ingredient objects
evade our recognition. These are the events in empty space. Such events
are only analysed for us by the intellectual probing of science.

Ingression is a relation which has various modes. There are obviously
very various kinds of objects; and no one kind of object can have the
same sort of relations to events as objects of another kind can have. We
shall have to analyse out some of the different modes of ingression
which different kinds of objects have into events.

But even if we stick to one and the same kind of objects, an object of
that kind has different modes of ingression into different events.
Science and philosophy have been apt to entangle themselves in a
simple-minded theory that an object is at one place at any definite
time, and is in no sense anywhere else. This is in fact the attitude of
common sense thought, though it is not the attitude of language which is
naively expressing the facts of experience. Every other sentence in a
work of literature which is endeavouring truly to interpret the facts of
experience expresses differences in surrounding events due to the
presence of some object. An object is ingredient throughout its
neighbourhood, and its neighbourhood is inde