fied by the bodily states excited by the ray. These signified
events (as is the case of images seen behind a mirror) may have very
little to do with the actual course of the ray. In the course of
evolution those animals have survived whose sense-awareness is
concentrated on those significations of their bodily states which are on
the average important for their welfare. The whole world of events is
signified, but there are some which exact the death penalty for
inattention.
The percipient event is always here and now in the associated present
duration. It has, what may be called, an absolute position in that
duration. Thus one definite duration is associated with a definite
percipient event, and we are thus aware of a peculiar relation which
finite events can bear to durations. I call this relation 'cogredience.'
The notion of rest is derivative from that of cogredience, and the
notion of motion is derivative from that of inclusion within a duration
without cogredience with it. In fact motion is a relation (of varying
character) between an observed event and an observed duration, and
cogredience is the most simple character or subspecies of motion. To sum
up, a duration and a percipient event are essentially involved in the
general character of each observation of nature, and the percipient
event is cogredient with the duration.
Our knowledge of the peculiar characters of different events depends
upon our power of comparison. I call the exercise of this factor in our
knowledge 'recognition,' and the requisite sense-awareness of the
comparable characters I call 'sense-recognition.' Recognition and
abstraction essentially involve each other. Each of them exhibits an
entity for knowledge which is less than the concrete fact, but is a real
factor in that fact. The most concrete fact capable of separate
discrimination is the event. We cannot abstract without recognition, and
we cannot recognise without abstraction. Perception involves
apprehension of the event and recognition of the factors of its
character.
The things recognised are what I call 'objects.' In this general sense
of the term the relation of extension is itself an object. In practice
however I restrict the term to those objects which can in some sense or
other be said to have a situation in an event; namely, in the phrase
'There it is again' I restrict the 'there' to be the indication of a
special event which is the situation of the object. Even so, there
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