owed his glory and his throne: was it likely
that he would desert our cause on the first opportunity he had of
showing his gratitude? It was impossible to anticipate such ingratitude;
still less, that he would sacrifice the real and permanent interests of
Sweden to his former jealousy of Napoleon, and perhaps to a weakness too
common among the upstart favourites of fortune; unless it be that the
submission of men who have newly attained to greatness to those who
boast of a transmitted rank, is a necessity of their position rather
than an error of their self-love.
In this great contest between aristocracy and democracy, the ranks of
the former had been joined by one of its most determined enemies.
Bernadotte being thrown almost singly among the ancient courts and
nobility, did every thing to merit his adoption by them, and succeeded.
But his success must have cost him dear, as in order to obtain it, he
was first obliged to abandon his old companions, and the authors of his
glory, in the hour of peril. At a later period he did more; he was seen
marching over their bleeding corses, joining with all their, and
formerly his, enemies, to overwhelm the country of his birth, and
thereby lay that of his adoption at the mercy of the first czar who
should be ambitious of reigning over the Baltic.
On the other hand, it would appear that the character of Bernadotte, and
the importance of Sweden in the decisive struggle which was about to
commence, were not sufficiently weighed in the political balance of
Napoleon. His ardent and exclusive genius hazarded too much; he
overloaded a solid foundation so much that he sank it. Thus it was, that
after justly appreciating the Swedish interests as naturally bound up
with his, the moment he wished to weaken the power of Russia, he fancied
that he could exact every thing from the Swedes without promising them
any thing in return: his pride did not make any allowance for theirs,
judging that they were too much interested in the success of his cause,
for them ever to think of separating themselves from it.
We must, however, take up the history a little earlier; facts will prove
that the defection of Sweden was as much attributable to the jealous
ambition of Bernadotte as to the unbending pride of Napoleon. It will be
seen that her new monarch assumed to himself a great part of the
responsibility of the rupture, by offering his alliance at the price of
an act of treachery.
When Napoleon r
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