ell as private persons.

Meanwhile, Napoleon still waited the result of the negotiations of
Lauriston and of Narbonne. He hoped to vanquish Alexander by the mere
aspect of his united army, and, above all, by the menacing splendour of
his residence at Dresden. He himself expressed this opinion, when, some
days after, at Posen, he said to General Dessolles, "The assemblage at
Dresden not having persuaded Alexander to make peace, it was now solely
to be expected from war."

On that day he talked of nothing but his former victories. It seemed as
if, doubtful of the future, he recurred to the past, and that he found
it necessary to arm himself with all his most glorious recollections, in
order to confront a peril of so great a magnitude. In fact, then, as
since, he felt the necessity of deluding himself with the alleged
weakness of his rival's character. As the period of so great an invasion
approached, he hesitated in considering it as certain; for he no longer
possessed the consciousness of his infallibility, nor that warlike
assurance which the fire and energy of youth impart, nor that feeling of
success which makes it certain.

In other respects, these parleys were not only attempts to preserve
peace, but an additional _ruse de guerre_. By them he hoped to render
the Russians either sufficiently negligent, to let themselves be
surprised, dispersed, or, if united, sufficiently presumptuous to
venture to wait his approach. In either case, the war would be finished
by a _coup-de-main_, or by a victory. But Lauriston was not received.
Narbonne, when he returned, stated, "that he had found the Russians in a
state of mind as remote from dejection as from boasting. From their
emperor's reply to him, it appeared that they preferred war to a
dishonourable peace; that they would take care not to expose themselves
to the hazards of a battle against too formidable an enemy; and that, in
short, they were resolved on making every sacrifice, in order to spin
out the war, and to baffle Napoleon."

This answer, which reached the emperor in the midst of the greatest
display of his glory, was treated with contempt. To say the truth, I
must add, that a great Russian nobleman had contributed to deceive him:
either from mistaken views, or from artifice, this Muscovite had
persuaded him, that his own sovereign would recede at the sight of
difficulties, and be easily discouraged by reverses. Unfortunately, the
remembrance of Alexander's obs