it two of Davoust's
divisions and Grouchy's cavalry. As to his left, he judged that one
Italian division, the Bavarian cavalry, and that of Ornano, about 10,000
men, would suffice to cover it. Such were the plans of Napoleon.

CHAP. VII.

He was on the heights of Borodino, taking a last survey of the whole
field of battle, and confirming himself in his plan, when Davoust
hastened up. This marshal had just examined the left of the Russians
with so much the more care, as it was the ground on which he was to
act, and he mistrusted his own eyes.

He begged the emperor "to place at his disposal his five divisions,
35,000 strong, and to unite with them Poniatowski, whose force was too
weak to turn the enemy by itself. Next day he would set this force in
motion; he would cover its march with the last shades of night, and with
the wood on which the Russian left wing was supported, and beyond which
he would pass by following the old road from Smolensk to Moscow; then,
all at once, by a precipitate manoeuvre, he would deploy 40,000 French
and Poles on the flank and in the rear of that wing. There, while the
emperor would occupy the front of the Muscovites by a general attack, he
would march impetuously from redoubt to redoubt, from reserve to
reserve, driving every thing from left to right on the high-road of
Mojaisk, where they should put an end at once to the Russian army, the
battle, and the war."

The emperor listened attentively to the marshal; but after meditating in
silence for some minutes, he replied, "No! it is too great a movement;
it would remove me too far from my object, and make me lose too much
time."

The Prince of Eckmuehl, however, from conviction, persisted in his point;
he undertook to accomplish his manoeuvre before six in the morning; he
protested that in another hour the greatest part of its effect would be
produced. Napoleon, impatient of contradiction, sharply replied with
this exclamation, "Ah! you are always for turning the enemy; it is too
dangerous a manoeuvre!" The marshal, after this rebuff, said no more:
he then returned to his post, murmuring against a prudence which he
thought unseasonable, and to which he was not accustomed; and he knew
not to what cause to attribute it, unless the looks of so many allies,
who were not to be relied on, an army so reduced, a position so remote,
and age, had rendered Napoleon less enterprising than he was.

The emperor, having decided, had returned