ttle of the war. It is the
final struggle of the civilized world against the domination of the
beast. It is Germany's final effort, and, in order that this may be
appreciated, it is necessary only to recount the conditions which
impelled Germany to take the offensive at this time.

[Sidenote: Germany's eastern ambitions attained.]

[Sidenote: A peace by compromise would be a German victory.]

The developments in Russia, so entirely favorable to Germany, led many
to believe that, having attained so completely their eastern ambitions,
the German leaders would rest content with what they had, and,
strengthening their lines in the west through reinforcements drawn from
the Russian front, remain on the defensive on the western front until a
peace could be arranged. With the German talons firmly fixed in the
throat of Ukraine; with Poland, Courland, and Lithuania practically
annexed, there was a certain element of reason in this contention. It
was entirely conceivable that with such strength in the west, Germany
could set in motion the machinery of a peace propaganda, and obtain a
peace conference which would enable her to work out a programme of
concessions in the west for concessions in the east--a peace by
compromise which would answer present needs while furnishing all future
requirements in case she decided to provoke another war. Thus Germany
would end the war with a victory just as truly as if she had won it on
the field of battle, and without the terrific loss in man power that an
offensive on the western front would entail.

[Sidenote: The Allies refuse a peace by compromise.]

In constructing this theory, however, certain essentials were ignored.
German voraciousness can never be satisfied. It is a bottomless pit
which can be filled only by pouring into it the world. When there is
nothing more to be had, Germany would perforce rest content. The
possession of Russia only whetted her appetite for France and Belgium
and the life of England. Moreover, the Allies, having now learned
Germany, and having acquired a sense of their own safety and of the
future peace of the world, had no thought of permitting Germany to
remain in possession of western Russia, of Serbia, and of Rumania, and
thereby not only perpetuating but actually aggravating the condition out
of which grew the present war. They had, therefore, notified Germany
that they would lay down arms only when she was willing to disgorge what
she and her allies h