west through Kemmel to Cassel. Moreover, in falling back the British
pivoted on Messines, which left this strong bastion from which to strike
out against the very heart of the salient. Accordingly, to remove this
danger the German leaders swung the attack north against the Messines
Ridge. After days of fighting in which Bailleul was taken and the foot
of the Kemmel series of hills was reached, the Messines Ridge was taken
in reverse and the British line was withdrawn until it passed over the
ridge just north of Wytschaete. Still pressing on the north, the Germans
attacked the Kemmel position, but the British, now reinforced by the
French, threw the attacks back as rapidly as they formed. Failing here
and at the centre in Nieppe Forest, still another attack was delivered,
this time against the southern side of the wedge from Givenchy to St.
Venant. The first two days of this fighting was also disastrous to the
Germans who were entirely unable to dent the British positions. In
brief, the Germans were then enclosed in a huge semicircle about fifteen
miles in diameter. All parts of the area enclosed were subject to
artillery fire from three sides and the Germans were striking first on
one side then on the other in frantic efforts to break the Allies'
grip--and giving no indication of sufficient power to succeed.
[Sidenote: Objectives of the Germans in the North.]
[Sidenote: The British gradually retire about Ypres.]
The objects of the German effort in the north were several. Primarily it
was intended as a means of breaking the defenses of Arras and of Lens by
cutting in behind the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette and Vimy Ridge.
Again it was intended to take Hazebrouck, Bethune, St. Pol, Aire, and
St. Omer, through which the distribution of supplies and men landing at
Calais is effected. Finally it was intended to take from the British the
high ground in Flanders, uncover Ypres, and open the way to the coast.
But for many reasons, now that the Allies had caught their breath for a
moment, so to speak, the advantage appeared to have passed from German
hands. The element of surprise, so essential to success even in trench
warfare, was no longer possible. The gradual retirements of the British
around Ypres were not costly nor did they "open a way" to the channel
ports as the Germans hoped. The Germans had fixed the points of
attack--and these were the only possible points: southern Flanders and
from the Avre to the Scarpe
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