also to magistrates and others, commanding them in the King's name to do
what their duty requires in cases where there is a vested right and no
other specific remedy. It has been held in the case referred to that as
the Supreme Court of the United States is by the Constitution rendered
incompetent to exercise this power, and as the circuit court of this
District is a court of general jurisdiction in cases at common law,
and the highest court of original jurisdiction in the District, the
right to issue the writ of mandamus is incident to its common-law
powers. Another ground relied upon to maintain the power in question
is that it was included by fair construction in the powers granted to
the circuit courts of the United States by the act "to provide for the
more convenient organization of the courts of the United States," passed
13th February, 1801; that the act establishing the circuit court of this
District, passed the 27th day of February, 1801, conferred upon that
court and the judges thereof the same powers as were by law vested in
the circuit courts of the United States and in the judges of the said
courts; that the repeal of the first-mentioned act, which took place in
the next year, did not divest the circuit court of this District of the
authority in dispute, but left it still clothed with the powers over the
subject which, it is conceded, were taken away from the circuit courts
of the United States by the repeal of the act of 13th February, 1801.
Admitting that the adoption of the laws of Maryland for a portion of
this District confers on the circuit court thereof, in that portion, the
transcendent extrajudicial prerogative powers of the court of king's
bench in England, or that either of the acts of Congress by necessary
implication authorizes the former court to issue a writ of mandamus to
an officer of the United States to compel him to perform a ministerial
duty, the consequences are in one respect the same. The result in either
case is that the officers of the United States stationed in different
parts of the United States are, in respect to the performance of
their official duties, subject to different laws and a different
supervision--those in the States to one rule, and those in the District
of Columbia to another and a very different one. In the District their
official conduct is subject to a judicial control from which in the
States they are exempt.
Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to t
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