ad greater than themselves. I can not
bring myself to depict the humiliation to which this Government and
people might be sooner or later reduced if the means for defending their
rights are to be made dependent upon those who may have the most
powerful of motives to impair them.

Nor is it only in reference to the effect of this state of things on the
independence of our Government or of our banks that the subject presents
itself for consideration; it is to be viewed also in its relations to
the general trade of our country. The time is not long passed when a
deficiency of foreign crops was thought to afford a profitable market
for the surplus of our industry, but now we await with feverish anxiety
the news of the English harvest, not so much from motives of commendable
sympathy, but fearful lest its anticipated failure should narrow the
field of credit there. Does not this speak volumes to the patriot? Can
a system be beneficent, wise, or just which creates greater anxiety for
interests dependent on foreign credit than for the general prosperity of
our own country and the profitable exportation of the surplus produce of
our labor?

The circumstances to which I have thus adverted appear to me to afford
weighty reasons, developed by late events, to be added to those which
I have on former occasions offered when submitting to your better
knowledge and discernment the propriety of separating the custody of the
public money from banking institutions. Nor has anything occurred to
lessen, in my opinion, the force of what has been heretofore urged.
The only ground on which that custody can be desired by the banks is
the profitable use which they may make of the money. Such use would
be regarded in individuals as a breach of trust or a crime of great
magnitude, and yet it may be reasonably doubted whether, first and last,
it is not attended with more mischievous consequences when permitted to
the former than to the latter. The practice of permitting the public
money to be used by its keepers, as here, is believed to be peculiar to
this country and to exist scarcely anywhere else. To procure it here
improper influences are appealed to, unwise connections are established
between the Government and vast numbers of powerful State institutions,
other motives than the public good are brought to bear both on the
executive and legislative departments, and selfish combinations leading
to special legislation are formed. It is made the i