ht fare worse than pass under the domination of the
Czar.

For the Chinese concerned, as has been suggested, the loss might be
almost, if not altogether, construed into a gain. They would acquire an
autocratic and despotic Government very similar to their own, only more
powerful and practical in its operation and results; and, if only one
could hope that the rights and prejudices of the people could be
respected, and their general interests consulted, the change would on
the whole prove an advantageous one for the annexed territories
generally. In one respect, at any rate, such a substitution might
certainly be expected to bring about a material amelioration of the
present condition and prospects of the country at large; and that is the
improvement of general communication throughout the empire. Railways
would undoubtedly be forthwith introduced, telegraphs laid down, river
channels cleared and deepened, canals restored and maintained, and the
many obstacles which now clog a might-be flourishing trade permanently
removed. China, in fact, only needs a lion-hearted, capable, and
progressive Government in order to encourage the enterprise of her
people, bring out their many excellent characteristics, and develop the
prolific natural resources which she undoubtedly possesses, in her own
interest and that of the world in general; and, provided always such a
result can be attained, combined with a discreet and paternal care for
the people themselves, no one had need deprecate the substitution of a
foreign for a native yoke.

It might be objected, Why should not such a thorough reconstruction and
subsequent healthy development be attainable under the present dynasty,
or, at any rate, under a purely native rule? To this we reply that it is
not in the nature of the Chinese to initiate reform or carry it honestly
and steadily out. Neither the rulers nor the ruled appreciate its
necessity; and, could they be enlightened sufficiently to perceive it,
they do not possess the strength of character and fixity of purpose to
follow out implicitly the course pointed out. A curious example of this
lack of interest and resolve was to be observed as regards the
foreign-drilled levies raised at the instance of their foreign advisers
after the treaty of Tientsin. Men and money were readily provided to the
extent suggested, and the men easily learnt the drill. But the foreign
instructors had always to superintend the paying of wages in order t