al and
independent Khanates to act as "buffers" between her territories and
those of Russia, and the development of a free and active trade between
the Indian and Central Asian markets. It seems scarcely worth the
trouble of refuting any arguments that could be brought forward to prove
that the concession of a covert or direct support to China in the
_Kuldja_ controversy would be likely to advantage England in any one of
these respects. On the contrary, her interference would more probably
imperil her interests under each head, and would most certainly have the
effect of greatly incensing a Power which, with all its ill-will, has
already shown its desire to conciliate, by withdrawing at our request
the influence which it had been tempted in view of certain contingencies
to use to our disadvantage in Afghanistan; a Power, too, which must and
will pursue its career of acquisition in Central Asia, whatever we may
say or do to the contrary; and with which, in view of its probable
future there, it is manifestly to our interest as holders of India to
live on neighbourly terms. To quote a recent writer on the subject,[2]
"Our object now should be rather to initiate a frank understanding with
Russia as to the aims of our respective policies, to secure her
agreement to definite boundaries to the spheres of influence of both
Powers, and to form, so far as is possible, a union of interests with
her in the future development of Asia."

Even were China to pledge herself to grant us all the advantages which
we should have to bargain for as a consideration for committing
ourselves to the serious step of affording her aid, it may be doubted
whether she is sufficiently strong to maintain her ground, not merely
against Russia, but against any adventurer like Yakoob Beg or rebels
like the Panthays, who may suddenly rise up and wrest her territory from
her. Then, again, it must be remembered what an alliance with such a
Government as that of China is likely to involve. Her civil
administration, based although it may be on a system excellently well
suited to a people like the Chinese, is so weakened, save in a few
isolated instances, by the incapacity, and so debased by the venality of
its executive, that it has long since forfeited the confidence and
good-will of the masses, and rebellion has only to raise its head to
find a fruitful soil for its speedy growth and development. Her army is
numerically large, and can be recruited without dif