manages to put the harsher side of his opinions in
front. This appears as we approach the ultimate base of his theory.

I have spoken more than once of Fitzjames's respect for Hobbes. For
Hobbes's theory of sovereignty, and even its application by the
ultramontane De Maistre, had always an attraction for him. Hobbes, with
his logical thoroughness, seems to carry the foundations of policy down
to the solid rock-bed of fact. Life is a battle; it is the conflict of
independent atoms; with differing aims and interests. The strongest, in
one way or other, will always rule. But the conflict may be decided
peacefully. You may show your cards instead of playing out the game; and
peace may be finally established though only by the recognition of a
supreme authority. The one question is what is to be the supreme
authority? With De Maistre it was the Church; with Fitzjames as with
Hobbes it was the State. The welfare of the race can only be secured by
order; order only by the recognition of a sovereign; and when that
order, and the discipline which it implies, are established, force does
not cease to exist: on the contrary, it is enormously increased in
efficacy; but it works regularly and is distributed harmoniously and
systematically instead of appearing in the chaotic clashing of countless
discordant fragments. The argument, which is as clear as Euclid in the
case of marriage, is valid universally. Society must be indissoluble;
and to be indissoluble must recognise a single ultimate authority in all
disputes. Peace and order mean subordination and discipline, and the
only liberty possible is the liberty which presupposes such 'coercion.'
The theory becomes harsh if by 'coercion' we mean simply 'physical
force' or the fear of pain. A doctrine which made the hangman the
ultimate source of all authority would certainly show brutality. But
nothing could be farther from Fitzjames's intention than to sanction
such a theory. His 'coercion' really includes an appeal to all the
motives which make peace and order preferable to war and anarchy. But it
is, I also think, a defect in the book that he does not clearly explain
the phrase, and that it slips almost unconsciously into the harsher
sense. He tells us, for example, that 'force is dependent upon
persuasion and cannot move without it.'[148] Nobody can rule without
persuading his fellows to place their force at his disposal; and
therefore he infers 'persuasion is a kind of force.' It ac