s opposed to coercion
in general, but as opposed to coercion in certain cases. What, then, are
the cases? Force is always in the background, the invisible bond which
corresponds to the moral framework of society. But we have still to
consider what limits may be laid down for its application. The general
reply of a Utilitarian must of course be an appeal to 'expediency.'
Force is good, says Fitzjames, following Bentham again, when the end to
be attained is good, when the means employed are efficient, and when,
finally, the cost of employing them is not excessive. In the opposite
cases, force of course is bad. Here he comes into conflict with Mill.
For Mill tries to lay down certain general rules which may define the
rightful limits of coercive power. Now there is a _prima facie_ ground
of suspicion to a sound utilitarian about any general rules. Mill's
rules were of course regarded by himself as based upon experience. But
they savoured of that absolute _a priori_ method which professes to
deduce principles from abstract logic. Here, therefore, he had, as his
opponent thought, been coquetting with the common adversary and seduced
into grievous error. A great part of the argument comes to this: Mill
advocates rules to which, if regarded as practical indications of
certain obvious limitations to the utility of Government interference,
Fitzjames has no objection. But when they are regarded as ultimate
truths, which may therefore override even the principle of utility
itself, they are to be summarily rejected. Thus, as we shall see, the
practical differences are often less than appears. It is rather a
question of the proper place and sphere of certain rules than of their
value in particular cases. Yet at bottom there is also a profound
divergence. I will try to indicate the main points at issue.

Mill's leading tenet has been already stated; the only rightful ground
of coercing our neighbours is self-protection. Using the Benthamite
terminology, we may say that we ought never to punish self-regarding
conduct, or again interpolating the utilitarian meaning of 'ought' that
such punishment cannot increase the general happiness. Fitzjames
complains that Mill never tries to prove this except by adducing
particular cases. Any attempt to prove it generally, would, he thinks,
exhibit its fallacy. For, in brief, the position would really amount to
a complete exclusion of the moral element from all social action. Men
influence each oth