flaws in his work, while he
honestly thought the criticism superfine, and the errata pointed out
such as concerned a mere corrector of the press rather than a serious
legislator for practical purposes. But I must not even attempt to
conjecture which was right and which was wrong, nor how far there might
be right and wrong upon both sides.

III. INDIAN IMPRESSIONS

These rather vague presumptions must take the place of any deliberate
estimate of the value of Fitzjames's achievements in India. I must,
however, say something more of the impression made upon his own mind. I
have already indicated some of the convictions suggested to him by his
experience, and I shall have to speak in the next chapter of the book in
which he endeavoured to set forth their application to political
principles in general. Here I will summarise his view of the special
principles of Indian legislation. It is given very emphatically in Sir
W. W. Hunter's 'Life of Lord Mayo,' and will, I think, materially
elucidate his position in regard to certain wider problems.

He observes, in the first place, that the legislative department had
been accused of over-activity and of a desire to introduce English law
with too little regard to native ideas. The chief legislative reform
required for India, he was often told, was the abolition of the
legislative department--an assertion which, I should guess, when made
in his presence, must have given rise to some rather lively discussions.
He thought that this view rested mainly upon certain prejudices very
generally entertained though not often stated in precise words. Many
civilians really objected to government by law, holding that in India
law should be overridden by 'equity,' or, briefly, that the district
officers should decide by their own views of each particular case. Such
persons, again, frequently held that the British rule had succeeded to
the absolute power of the old native states, and that the vigour of the
executive should be fettered by as few laws as possible. This feeling
had been strengthened by the fact that the old supreme courts were
originally established as a check upon the powers of the Government. The
two powers came to be regarded as in a position of natural antagonism,
and nothing struck him more than the conviction of the older members of
the service that lawyers were their natural enemies, and the law a
mysterious power with the special function of trammelling executive
action. V