amiable, though not, I think, a truer view of the matter, some think our
rule ought to rest--though it is hardly possible to overrate the value
of such sympathy, where it can by any means be obtained. I believe that
the real foundation of our power will be found to be an inflexible
adherence to broad principles of justice common to all persons in all
countries and all ages, and enforced with unflinching firmness in favour
of, or against, everyone who claims their benefit or who presumes to
violate them, no matter who he may be. To govern impartially upon these
broad principles is to govern justly, and I believe that not only
justice itself, but the honest attempt to be just, is understood and
acknowledged in every part of the world alike.'

In the next place the principle of religious equality, 'properly
understood, is just as much one of these principles as the principle of
suppressing war, famine, and crime.' Properly understood it means that
all sects are to be encouraged and, if necessary, are to be compelled to
live in peace with each other; and not to injure those who change their
religion. This is the principle, moreover, which we have practically
adopted, and which is indeed necessary under the circumstances. The
native marriage law is 'personal,' not territorial. It depends upon a
man's religion, not upon the place of his abode. Hence you must choose
between forbidding a man to change his religion and permitting him to
change his law. But to forbid conversion would be obviously impossible,
and we in fact allow Christian converts to change their legal status.
Why is not a similar liberty to be granted to others who have abandoned
their religion? Because Christianity is true and all other religions
false? That would be the only relevant answer, and many people would
really like to give it; but it is refuted by stating it. We cannot
attack the Hindoo or Mohammedan religions. If, therefore, we took this
ground, we should simply have a conspiracy of four or five dominant
sects, each denouncing the others as false, but all agreeing to worry
and oppress all outsiders. Such a position is impossible for us. The
real objection to the bill was simply that it recognised the fact that
many persons had abandoned their religion; and also recognises the fact
that they had a right to abandon it.

Here, then, is one of the cases in which the argument from native
opinion must be faced. 'It is a grave thing to legislate in opposit