te, and shows how
widespread was the conspiracy, that out of all the thousands promised,
Mr. Osborn was only able to call out two thousand men.

The appointment, however, that has occasioned the most criticism is that
of John Dunn, who got the Benjamin share of Zululand in preference to
his brother chiefs. The converting of an Englishman into a Zulu chief is
such a very odd proceeding that it is difficult to know what to think of
it. John Dunn is an ambitious man, and most probably has designs on the
throne; he is also a man who understands the value of money, of which
he makes a great deal out of his chieftainship. At the same time, it is
clear that, so far as it goes, his rule is better than that of the other
chiefs; he has a uniform tax fixed, and has even done something in the
way of starting schools and making roads. From all that I have been able
to gather, his popularity and influence with the Zulus are overrated,
though he has lived amongst them so many years, and taken so many of
their women to wife. His appointment was a hazardous experiment, and in
the long run is likely to prove a mischievous one, since any attempted
amendment of the settlement will be violently resisted by him on the
ground of vested interests. Also, if white men are set over Zulus at
all, they should be _gentlemen_ in the position of government officers,
not successful adventurers.

Perhaps the only wise thing done in connection with the settlement was
the appointment of Mr. Osborn, C.M.G., as British Resident. It is not
easy to find a man fitted for that difficult and dangerous position, for
the proper filling of which many qualifications are required. Possessed
of an intimate knowledge of the Zulus, their language, and their mode of
thought and life, and being besides a very able and energetic officer,
Mr. Osborn would have saved the settlement from breaking down if anybody
could have saved it. As it is, by the exercise of ceaseless energy and
at great personal risk, he has preserved it from total collapse. Of the
dangers and anxieties to which he is exposed, the account I have given
of the Sitimela incident is a sufficient example. He is, in fact,
nothing but a shadow, for he has no force at his command to ensure
obedience to his decisions, or to prevent civil war; and in Zululand,
oddly enough, force is a remedy. Should one chief threaten the peace of
the country, he can only deal with him by calling on another chief for
aid, a positi