t make us self-denying, that we may be liberal in
relieving others? Does it make us persevere in doing good in spite of
ingratitude; and only pity the ignorance, or prejudice, or malice, which
misrepresents our conduct, or misconstrues our motives? Does it make us
forbear from what we conceive may probably prove the occasion of harm
to a fellow-creature; though the harm should not seem naturally or even
fairly to flow from our conduct, but to be the result only of his own
obstinacy or weakness? Are we slow to believe any thing to our
neighbour's disadvantage? and when we cannot but credit it, are we
disposed rather to cover, and as far as we justly can, to palliate, than
to divulge or aggravate it? Suppose an opportunity to occur of
performing a kindness, to one who from pride or vanity should be loth to
receive, or to be known to receive, a favour from us; should we honestly
endeavour, so far as we could with truth, to lessen in his own mind and
in that of others the merit of our good offices, and by so doing dispose
him to receive them with diminished reluctance, and a less painful
weight of obligation? This end, however, must be accomplished, if to be
accomplished at all, by a simple and fair explanation of the
circumstances, which may render the action in no wise inconvenient to
ourselves, though highly beneficial to another; not by speeches of
affected disparagement, which we might easily foresee, and in fact do
foresee, must produce the contrary effect. Can we, from motives of
kindness, incur or risk the charge of being deficient in spirit, in
penetration, or in foresight? Do we tell another of his faults, when the
communication, though probably beneficial to _him_, cannot be made
without embarrassment or pain to ourselves, and may probably lessen his
regard for our person, or his opinion of our judgment? Can we stifle a
repartee which would wound another; though the utterance of it would
gratify our vanity, and the suppression of it may disparage our
character for wit? If any one advance a mistaken proposition, in an
instance wherein the error may be mischievous to him; can we, to the
prejudice perhaps of our credit for discernment, forbear to contradict
him in public, if it be probable that in so doing, by piquing his pride
we might only harden him in his error? and can we reserve our counsel
for some more favourable season, the "mollia tempora fandi," when it may
be communicated without offence? If we have recomm