place, they ought to have harassed us with continual skirmishing;
felled trees on each side, and thrown them across the road; dug
deep ditches at certain intervals; in a word, it was their wisdom
to adopt the mode of warfare to which their own habits, as, well
as the nature of their country, invited them.
In America, every man is a marksman from his very boyhood, and
every man serves in the militia; but to bring an army of raw
militia-men, however excellent they might be as marksmen, into a
fair field against regular troops, could end in nothing but
defeat. When two lines oppose each other, very little depends
upon the accuracy with which individuals take aim. It is then
that the habit of acting in concert, the confidence which each
man feels in his a companions, and the rapidity and good order in
which different movements can be executed, are alone of real
service. But put these raw militia-men into thick woods, and
send your regular troops to drive them out, and you will
immediately lose all the advantages of discipline, and reduce
your battle to so many single combats.
Here, therefore, lay their principal error: had they left all
clear, and Permitted us to advance as far as Nottingham, then
broken up the roads, and covered them with trees, it would have
been impossible for us to go a step beyond. As soon as this was
effected, they might have skirmished with us in front, and kept
our attention alive with part of their troops, till the rest,
acquainted as they doubtless were with every inch of the country,
had got into our rear, and, by a similar mode of proceeding, cut
off our retreat. Thus we should have been taken in a snare, from
which it would have been no easy task to extricate ourselves, and
might, perhaps, have been obliged in the end to surrender at
discretion.
But so obvious and so natural a plan of defence they chose to
reject ad determining to trust all to the fate of a battle, they
were guilty of a monstrous error again. Bladensburg ought not to
have been left unoccupied. The most open village, if resolutely
defended, will cost many men before it falls; whereas
Bladensburg, being composed of substantial brick houses, might
have been maintained for hours against all our efforts. In the
next place, they displayed great want of military knowledge in
the disposition of both their infantry and artillery. There was
not, in the whole space of their position, a single point where
an enemy would
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