of the Constitution."

[Footnote 101: It is sometimes interesting to preserve the names of
individuals who have perpetrated bold and unusual enormities.]

The phraseology of this resolution is as clumsy as its assertions are
base and sophistical. The meaning intended to be expressed is simply,
that the Constitution of Ohio, neither in terms nor by implication,
confers on such residents as are negroes or mulattoes, any right
to offer a petition to the legislature for any object whatever; nor
imposes on that body any obligation to notice such a petition; and
whatever attention it may please to bestow upon it, ought to be
regarded as an act not of duty, but merely of favor or expediency.
Hence it is obvious, that the _principle_ on which the resolution is
founded is, that the reciprocal right and duty of offering and
hearing petitions _rest solely on constitutional enactment_, and not
on moral obligation. The reception of negro petitions is declared
to be a mere act of _privilege or policy_. Now it is difficult to
imagine a principle more utterly subversive of all the duties of
rulers, the rights of citizens, and the charities of private life.
The victim of oppression or fraud has no _right_ to appeal to the
constituted authorities for redress; nor are those authorities under
any obligation to consider the appeal--the needy and unfortunate
have no right to implore the assistance of their more fortunate
neighbors: and all are at liberty to turn a deaf ear to the cry of
distress. The eternal and immutable principles of justice and
humanity, proclaimed by Jehovah, and impressed by him on the
conscience of man, have no binding force on the legislature of Ohio,
unless expressly adopted and enforced by the State Constitution!

But as the legislature has thought proper thus to set at defiance the
moral sense of mankind, and to take refuge behind the enactments of
the Constitution, let us try the strength of their entrenchments. The
words of the Constitution, which it is pretended sanction the
resolution we are considering are the following, viz.--"The _people_
have a right to assemble together in a peaceable manner to consult
for their common good, to _instruct their representatives_, and to
apply to the legislature for a redress of grievances." It is obvious
that this clause confers no rights, but is merely declaratory of
existing rights. Still, as the right of the people to apply for a
redress of grievances is coupled wit