en buried, without
doing either. And does it load us with any absurdity to prove that
we shall be obliged to do from principle, what the majority of our
fellow-citizens do from choice? We lawyers may think it is an
absurdity to say a man can't sue, for, like the Apostle at Ephesus,
it touches our "craft," but that don't go far to prove it. Then, as
to taxes, doubtless many cases might be imagined, when every one
would allow it to be our duty to resist the slightest taxation, did
Christianity allow it, with "war to the hilt." If such cases may
ever arise, why may not this be one?

Until I become an Irishman, no one will ever convince me that I
ought to vote, by proving that I ought not to pay taxes! Suppose
all these difficulties do really encompass us, it will not be
the first time that the doing of one moral duty has revealed a
dozen others which we never thought of. The child has climbed the
hill over his native village, which he thought the end of the world,
and lo! there are mountains beyond! He won't remedy the matter by
creeping back to his cradle and disbelieving in mountains!

But then, is there any such inconsistency in non-voters sueing and
paying taxes?

Look at it. A. and B. have agreed on certain laws, and appointed C.
to execute them. A. owes me, who am no party to the contract, a just
debt, which his laws oblige him to pay. Do I acknowledge the
rightfulness of his relation to B. and C. by asking C. to use the
power given him, in my behalf? It appears to me that I do not. I may
surely ask A. to pay me my debt--why not then ask the keeper, whom
he has appointed over himself, to make him do so?

I am a prisoner among pirates. The mate is abusing me in some way
contrary to their laws. Do I recognize the rightfulness of the
Captain's authority, by asking him to use the power the mate has
consented to give him, to protect me? It seems to me that I do not
necessarily endorse the means by which a man has acquired money or
power, when I ask him to use either in my behalf.

An alien does not recognize the rightfulness of a government by
living under it. It has always been held that an English subject may
swear allegiance to an usurper and yet not be guilty of treason to
the true king. Because he may innocently acknowledge the king
_de facto_ (the king _in deed_,) without assuming him to be king
_de jure_ (king by _right_.) The distinction itself is as old as
the time of Edward the First. The principle is equ