tingly but
explicitly, conceded the main question argued in the preceding pages.
The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery
in the District is, that it existed in Maryland and Virginia when the
cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it could
not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was
implied in the cession." &c. The _sole argument_ is _not_ that exclusive
_sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction,
_nor_ that the powers of even _ordinary legislation_ cannot do
it,--_nor_ that the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in
all cases whatsoever over such District," gives no power to do it; but
that the _unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other
would not "in _all_ cases" _use_ the power which said party had
consented _might be used_ "_in all cases_," _prohibits_ the use of it.
The only cardinal point in the discussion, is here not only _yielded_,
but formally laid down by the South as the leading article in their
creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the
District. The _sole reason_ given why Congress should not abolish, and
the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of
"good faith," is that "_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus
explicitly admitting, that if slavery did _not_ "still continue" in
those States, Congress _could_ abolish it in the District. The same
admission is made also in the _premises_, which state that slavery
existed in those states _at the time of the cession_, &c. Admitting that
if it had _not_ existed there then, but had grown up in the District
under _United States' laws_, Congress might constitutionally abolish it.
Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the _only_ parts in
which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished
in such a contingency also. The cession in that case leaving no slaves
in those states,--no "good faith," would be "implied" in it, nor any
"violated," by an act of abolition. The principle of the resolution
makes this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at
once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the
District. The principle goes even further than this, and _requires_
Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District "by the _good
faith implied_ in the cession and acceptance of the territory." Since
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