policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from
the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact,
dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the
bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic
mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt
that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any
possibility before then.

How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless
opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal
military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes,
and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism with
enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly
stated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate.
Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for
civil war--the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to national
armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy
_until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself
freed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. There is probably not
a militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament
as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind
reaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will then
become practicable and logical. It would not be difficult for General Wood
to subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficult
for Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it.

Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight
for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an
attack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in the
continued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this _and provides
a theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance of
ever-increasing militarism_. He draws a strangely forced parallel between
the Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be
taken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils.
Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with the
trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward,
through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should not