octrine of concomitance is
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.
It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early
as the _Kathavatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of
the _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses
such as the udahara@na (_Yo yo aggima so so dhumava_--whatever is
fiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhumava_--this
hill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasmadayam aggima_--therefore
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the
method of the arguments which are found in the _Kathavatthu_ as
follows:
"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thapana_).
Opponent. Yes.
Adherent. Is _C D_? (_papana_).
Opponent. No.
Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.
That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")
The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thapana,
because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally
established for the purpose of refutation.
The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed
papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion
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is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the
opponent. Next:
"If _D_ be derived of _C_.
Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.
But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.
(therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is
wrong."
This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major
in the latter method we get
"If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.
But _A_ is _B_.
Therefore _C_ is _D_.
By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished
[Footnote ref 1]."
The Doctrine of Momentariness.
Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of
all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the
method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyapti_), and then by the
method of difference by proving that the production of effects
could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent
and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness
as the only alternative. Existence is defined as th
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