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ints of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame _________________________________________________________________ [Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya, samabhiru@dha-naya_, and _evambhula-naya_. See _Vis'e@savas'yaka bha@sya_, pp. 895-923.] 179 things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syat_ (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syadvada [Footnote ref 1]. The Doctrine of Syadvada. The doctrine of Syadvada holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syadasti_ or "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (_syadavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (_syadasti syannasti_); all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (_syadasti cavaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (_syadasti syannasti syadavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (syat) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in
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