ostponed, therefore, the summoning the militia
immediately into the field, but I required them to be held in readiness,
that if my anxious endeavors to reclaim the deluded and to convince the
malignant of their danger should be fruitless, military force might be
prepared to act before the season should be too far advanced.

My proclamation of the 7th of August last was accordingly issued, and
accompanied by the appointment of commissioners, who were charged to
repair to the scene of insurrection. They were authorized to confer with
any bodies of men or individuals. They were instructed to be candid
and explicit in stating the sensations which had been excited in the
Executive, and his earnest wish to avoid a resort to coercion; to
represent, however, that, without submission, coercion _must_ be the
resort; but to invite them, at the same time, to return to the demeanor
of faithful citizens, by such accommodations as lay within the sphere of
Executive power. Pardon, too, was tendered to them by the Government of
the United States and that of Pennsylvania, upon no other condition
than a satisfactory assurance of obedience to the laws.

Although the report of the commissioners marks their firmness and
abilities, and must unite all virtuous men, by shewing that the means
of conciliation have been exhausted, all of those who had committed or
abetted the tumults did not subscribe the mild form which was proposed
as the atonement, and the indications of a peaceable temper were neither
sufficiently general nor conclusive to recommend or warrant the further
suspension of the march of the militia.

Thus the painful alternative could not be discarded. I ordered the
militia to march, after once more admonishing the insurgents in my
proclamation of the 25th of September last.

It was a task too difficult to ascertain with precision the lowest
degree of force competent to the quelling of the insurrection. From
a respect, indeed, to economy and the ease of my fellow-citizens
belonging to the militia, it would have gratified me to accomplish
such an estimate. My very reluctance to ascribe too much importance
to the opposition, had its extent been accurately seen, would have
been a decided inducement to the smallest efficient numbers, In this
uncertainty, therefore, I put into motion 15,000 men, as being an army
which, according to all human calculation, would be prompt and adequate
in every view, and might, perhaps, by rendering res