o allow her to
take part in the discussions of Luneville, but on condition that she
should sign a treaty with him without the intervention of Austria. This
England refused to do. Weary of this uncertainty, and the tergiversation
of Austria, which was still under the influence of England, and feeling
that the prolongation of such a state of things could only turn to his
disadvantage, Bonaparte broke the armistice. He had already consented to
sacrifices which his successes in Italy did not justify. The hope of an
immediate peace had alone made him lose sight of the immense advantages
which victory had given him.

Far from appearing sensible to the many proofs of moderation which the
First Consul evinced, the combined insolence of England and Austria
seemed only to increase. Orders were immediately given for resuming the
offensive in Germany and Italy, and hostilities then recommenced.

The chances of fortune were long doubtful. After a reverse Austria made
promises, and after an advantage she evaded them; but finally, fortune
proved favourable to France. The French armies in Italy and Germany
crossed the Mincio and the Danube, and the celebrated battle of
Hohenlinden brought the French advanced posts within ten leagues of
Vienna. This victory secured peace; for, profiting by past experience,
the First Consul would not hear of any suspension of arms until Austria
should consent to a separate treaty. Driven into her last intrenchments,
Austria was obliged to yield. She abandoned England; and the English
Cabinet, in spite of the subsidy of 2,000,000 sterling, consented to the
separation. Great Britain was forced to come to this arrangement in
consequence of the situation to which the successes of the army of Moreau
had reduced Austria, which it was certain would be ruined by longer
resistance.

England wished to enter into negotiations at Luneville. To this the
First Consul acceded; but, as he saw that England was seeking to deceive
him, he required that she should suspend hostilities with France, as
Austria had done. Bonaparte very reasonably alleged that an indefinite
armistice on the Continent would be more to the disadvantage of France
than a long armistice by sea would be unfavourable to England. All this
adjourned the preliminaries to 1801 and the peace to 1802.

The impatience and indignation of the First Consul had been highly
excited by the evasions of Austria and the plots of England, for he knew
all the intrig