rmy.

Already, in 1808, Metternich had written from Paris to his Court,
"It is no longer the nation that fights: the present war (Spain) is
Napoleon's war; it is not even that of his army." But Napoleon
himself was aware of the danger of the Empire from its own extent.
In the silence of his cabinet his secretary Meneval sometimes heard
him murmur, "L'arc est trop longtemps tendu."]--

by new customs, new manners, and new laws, imposed by force, and forming
a heterogeneous whole, which could not fail to dissolve, as soon as the
influence of the power which had created it should cease to operate.
Such was the state of Italy that I have been informed by an individual
worthy of credit that if the army of Prince Eugene, instead of being
victorious, had been beaten on the Piava, a deeply-organised revolution
would have broken out in Piedmont, and even in the Kingdom of Italy,
where, nevertheless, the majority of the people fully appreciated the
excellent qualities of Eugene. I have been also credibly informed that
lists were in readiness designating those of the French who were to be
put to death, as well as those by whom the severe orders of the Imperial
Government had been mitigated, and who were only to be banished. In
fact, revolt was as natural to the Italians as submission to the Germans,
and as the fury of despair to the Spanish nation. On this subject I may
cite an observation contained in one of the works of Alfieri, published
fifteen years before the Spanish war. Taking a cursory view of the
different European nations he regarded--the Spaniards as the only people
possessed of "sufficient energy to struggle against foreign usurpation."
Had I still been near the person of Napoleon I would most assuredly have
resorted to an innocent artifice, which I had several times employed, and
placed the work of Alfieri on his table open at the page I wished him to
read. Alfieri's opinion of the Spanish people was in the end fully
verified; and I confess I cannot think without shuddering of the torrents
of blood which inundated the Peninsula; and for what? To make Joseph
Bonaparte a King!

The commencement of 1811 was sufficiently favourable to the French arms
in Spain, but towards the beginning of March the aspect of affairs
changed. The Duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the valour of his troops,
was unsuccessful at Chiclana; and from that day the French army could not
make head against the combined forces of