nse correspondence, which, however, was
unattended by any result. The notes and orders remained in the
portfolios, and the contingents stayed at home.

M. Metternich, whose talent has since been so conspicuously displayed,
had been for upwards of a year Ambassador from Austria to Paris. Even
then he excelled in the art of guiding men's minds, and of turning to the
advantage of his policy his external graces and the favour he acquired in
the drawing-room. His father, a clever man, brought up in the old
diplomatic school of Thugut and Kaunitz, had early accustomed him to the
task of making other Governments believe, by means of agents, what might
lead them into error and tend to the advantage of his own Government.
His manoeuvres tended to make Austria assume a discontented and haughty
tone; and wishing, as she said, to secure her independence, she publicly
declared her intention of protecting herself against any enterprise
similar to those of which she had so often been the victim. This
language, encouraged by the complete evacuation of Germany, and the war
in Spain, the unfortunate issue of which was generally foreseen, was
used--in time of peace between the two empires, and when France was not
threatening war to Austria.

--[Metternich arrived in Paris as Ambassador on 4th August 1806,
after Austria had been vanquished at Austerlitz. It does not seem
probable, either from his views or his correspondence, that he
advised the rash attempt of Austria to attack Napoleon by herself;
compare Metternich tome 1. p. 69, on the mistake of Prussia in 1805
and 1806; see also tome ii. p. 221, "To provoke a war with France
would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand, the tone of
his correspondence in 1808 seams calculated to make Austria believe
that war was inevitable, and that her forces, "so inferior to those
of France before the insurrection in Spain, will at least be equal
to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 808). What is
curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while
Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he
was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause
more than that of Austria.

M. Metternich, who had instructions from his Court, gave no satisfactory
explanation of those circumstances to Napoleon, who immediately raised a
conscription, and brought soldiers from Spain into Germany.

It was neces