ved _a priori_: "It is
the theory of Anarchism which must lead us with special force to a
train of thought that has never yet appeared in the literature of
legal philosophy, although it makes clear, in a manner universally
valid, the necessity of legal compulsion in itself and justifies legal
organisation. For the antithesis of our present mode of social life,
based on law and right, is, as conceived by Anarchism as its ideal and
goal, the union and ordering of men in freely formed communities, and
entirely under rules framed by convention. Though the individual
Anarchist may regard a union of egoists as a postulate, or may desire
fraternal Communism, yet each must determine for himself his
connection with such a community. Let him enter freely into the
supposed agreement and break it again as seems good to him, it is
still the stipulations of the agreement that bind him as long as the
agreement exists; an agreement which he must first enter into and can
at any time break regardless of conditions by a new expression of his
will. From this it is that this kind of organisation, which forms the
core of the theory of Anarchism, is only possible for such of mankind
as are actually qualified and capable of uniting with others in some
form of agreement. Those who are not capable of acting for themselves,
as we jurists say, such as the little child, those who are of unsound
mind, incapacitated by illness and old age, all these would be
entirely excluded from such an organisation and from all social life.
For as soon as, for example, an infant has been taken into this
society and subjected to its rules, the compulsion of law would have
been again introduced, and authority would have been exercised over a
human being without the proper rules for his assent being observed.
The Anarchist organisation of man's social life therefore fails,
inasmuch as it is possible only for certain special persons, qualified
empirically, and excludes others who lack these qualifications. I
therefore conclude the necessity of legal compulsion, not from the
fact that without it the small and weak would fare but badly; for I
cannot know this for certain beforehand and as a general rule. Nor do
I deduce the recognised and justified existence of legal arrangements
from the fact that only by these can the 'true' freedom of each
individual be attained without the interference of any third person;
for that would not be justified by the facts of history, and