ore, because England could best
supply the goods that Americans wanted; and it is such considerations,
and not acts of Parliament, that determine trade in its natural and
proper channels. In 1783 Pitt introduced into Parliament a bill which
would have secured mutual unconditional free trade between the two
countries; and this was what such men as Franklin, Jefferson, and
Madison desired. Could this bill have passed, the hard feelings
occasioned by the war would soon have died out, the commercial progress
of both countries would have been promoted, and the stupid measures
which led to a second war within thirty years might have been prevented.
But the wisdom of Pitt found less favour in Parliament than the dense
stupidity of Lord Sheffield, who thought that to admit Americans to the
carrying trade would undermine the naval power of Great Britain. Pitt's
measure was defeated, and the regulation of commerce with America was
left to the king in council. Orders were forthwith passed as if upon the
theory that America poor would be a better customer than America rich.

[Sidenote: Ship-building in New England.]

[Sidenote: British navigation acts and orders in council directed
against American commerce.]

The carrying trade to the West Indies had been one of the most important
branches of American industry. The men of New England were famous for
seamanship, and better and cheaper ships could be built in the seaports
of Massachusetts than anywhere in Great Britain. An oak vessel could be
built at Gloucester or Salem for twenty-four dollars per ton; a ship of
live-oak or American cedar cost not more than thirty-eight dollars per
ton. On the other hand, fir vessels built on the Baltic cost thirty-five
dollars per ton, and nowhere in England, France, or Holland could a ship
be made of oak for less than fifty dollars per ton. Often the cost was
as high as sixty dollars. It was not strange, therefore, that before the
war more than one third of the tonnage afloat under the British flag was
launched from American dock-yards. The war had violently deprived
England of this enormous advantage, and now she sought to make the
privation perpetual, in the delusive hope of confining British trade to
British keels, and in the belief that it was the height of wisdom to
impoverish the nation which she regarded as her best customer. In July,
1783, an order in council proclaimed that henceforth all trade between
the United States and the British